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Seneca and the Stoic View of Suicide
1. Introduction
Seneca was passionately interested in the problem of suicide. His philosophical works, 
and especially the Letters to Lucilius, are filled with discussions of it, ^  and memorable 
accounts of his own suicide are preserved in Tacitus and Dio Cassius.^ The significance of 
Seneca’s interest in suicide has been vigorously debated.1 23 John Rist has questioned the 
orthodoxy of Seneca’s treatment of suicide.4 *6Rist argues that Seneca departs from the 
earlier Stoic position on suicide in a number of ways,5 but especially with the new 
emphasis he places on the freedom (libertas) that suicide offers man. Miriam Griffin has 
answered many of Rist’s objections.^ She argues that most of what look to Rist like 
deviations from orthodox Stoic teaching on suicide are differences in emphasis,7 and that 
Seneca’s stress on suicide is somewhat misleading. What he primarily wants to rid us of is 
the fear of death. Although I agree with most of Griffin’s account, I think she does not do 
full justice to the connection Seneca draws between suicide and freedom.
1 For a complete list and analysis of the passages in which Seneca discusses suicide, see Tadic- 
Gilloteaux (1963). The first part of the article argues that what Seneca says about suicide in a 
particular work (or whether he discusses it all) is influenced by the addressee of the work. Seneca 
never discusses the topic in the works addressed to Nero or Polybius, for example, and has the most to 
say about it in his Letters (which are all addressed to Lucilius).
2 Tacitus Ann. 15. 62-64; Dio 62. 25.
3 See, Bonhöffer (1894) 29-39,188-193; Tadic-Gilloteaux (1963), Rist (1969) 246-250, Sandbach 
(1975) 48-52, Griffin (1976) 367-388, (1986), and Grisé (1982) 206-218.
4 Rist (1969) 246-250.
3 Among other things, Rist argues that Seneca neglects the need for a “divine call,” and sees suicide as 
“peculiarly ennobling.”
6 Griffin (1976) 374-376,383-388. Griffin does a particularly good job of showing that Seneca does 
allude to the need for a divine sign.
N. Tadic-Gilloteaux (1963) 541-551 also sees it in this way.7
In what follows, I will present a summary of the Stoic doctrine on suicide before 
Seneca, followed by an analysis of Seneca’s own views. Our sources on Stoic views of 
suicide before Seneca are meager. But they allow us to construct a coherent Stoic theory of 
suicide, and in Seneca we see the theory fleshed out. Rist is right to point out that we find 
a connection between suicide and libertas for the first time in Seneca, but wrong to suppose 
that it is inconsistent with earlier Stoic teaching, pathological, or based on a hatred of life.8 
Seneca’s views are consistent with earlier, orthodox Stoic views on suicide. Seneca adapts 
and builds on the Stoic theory of suicide in a way that is well thought out and perhaps 
original. He makes the possibility of suicide and the freedom it provides play an important 
role in the attainment of tranquillity, virtue, and happiness.
2. The Early Stoic View of Suicide
Stoicism was famous in antiquity for its acceptance of suicide. Not only did it defend 
the right of the wise man to seek a reasonable departure (eulogos exagôgê) from life,9 but 
its founder, Zeno, and his successor Cleanthes, died by committing suicide. 10 How did 
suicide fit into their philosophic system?
The Stoics taught that the goal of all human beings was to live in accordance with 
nature. They believed that the only good was virtue, the only evil vice. All other things 
they classified as adiaphora, or “indifférents.” They distinguished between two classes of 
indifferents: (1) “things preferred” (proêgmena), a class which includes “life, health, 
pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, reputation, noble birth,” H and are said to be in 
accordance with nature, and (2) “things not preferred” (<apoproêgmena), a class which 8910*
8 Rist (1969) 249 “The remark (sc. that it is wrong to hate life too much) gives him away; his own 
view is based on a hatred of life...Fundamentally Seneca’s wise man is in love with death. He is 
looking out for a tolerable pretext to die.”
9 SVF 3. 757-768
10 See D.L. 7. 28 (Zeno), 7. 176 (Cleanthes).
H  D.L. 7 .102 . Translation from Long and Sedley Vol. I (1987) 354. I argue below that there are 
reasons for thinking freedom {libertas) was one o f the proêgmena.
includes their opposites, “death, disease, pain, ugliness, weakness, poverty, low repute, 
ignoble birth and the like,” 12 and are said not to be in accordance with nature.
When a human being is bom, his or her primary impulse is towards self-preservation.
Next, as the person grows, he or she learns as far as possible to choose things that are
preferred, and to avoid things that are not preferred. These activities of living in
accordance with nature were called kathêkonta (“proper functions, duties”). Thus, the
Stoics taught, it was natural for human beings, and ordinarily a kathêkon, to stay alive,
since we have an impulse to self-preservation, and since life is one of the things preferred
and in accordance with nature. The Stoics further distinguished two types of kathêkonta:
those that do not depend on circumstances {ta aneu peristaseôs), and those that do (ta
peristatika). I3 The former are duties it is always appropriate to choose, such as looking
after one’s health; the latter are duties which would not normally be chosen, but which
could be required by unusual circumstances, and include actions like maiming oneself and
giving away one’s possessions. Suicide belongs to the latter class. ^  The Stoics taught
that there were occasions, when the timing and reason were right, ^  a man could commit
suicide. Diogenes Laertius (7. 130) reports:^
[The Stoics] say that the wise man will commit a well-reasoned suicide both 
on behalf of his country and on behalf of his friends, and if he falls victim 
to unduly severe pain or mutilation or incurable illness.
The conditions that Diogenes Laertius gives for when the Stoic wise man would rationally
commit suicide fall into two categories. ^  1234*7
12 Ibid.
13 D.L. 7. 109.
14 Suicide is not listed in the D.L. passage (D.L. 7. 109), but Griffin (1986) 73 seems right to include 
it among this group.
Emphasis is placed on the right timing {*opportune) in De Finibus 3. 60-61. The Stoics may have 
thought that the wise man could recognize that the timing was right by means of heeding a divine 
call. On the divine call, see Rist (1976) 243, Griffin (1976) 374-376.
*6 Translation from Long and Sedley Vol. I (1987) 425.
17 lam  indebted to Griffin (1976) 376-383 and (1986) 72-75 for much of my discussion of the three 
Stoic reasons for suicide.
(1) Obligations to others. The first type of situation that requires a Stoic wise man to 
commit suicide is one in which he is called upon to give his life because of his obligations 
to others, such as his country or friends. Since right action is the only good, while life is 
not a good, but only something preferable, the wise man must sacrifice his life for 
important obligations.^
(2) Imbalance of the Indifferents. The second type of situation, involving “unduly
severe pain or mutilation or incurable illness,” is one explained at greater length by Cicero
in De Finibus 3. 60-61.19 Although the Stoics taught that virtue was the only good, and
vice the only evil, they did not conclude from this, like the Cynics, that the only the wise
man should live, and everyone else commit suicide.^  The Stoics believed that virtue was
exercised by selecting the indifferents in accordance with nature, and avoiding those
contrary to nature. They argued that?l
When a man has a preponderance of the things in accordance with nature, it 
is his proper function (officium) to remain alive; when he has or foresees a 
preponderance of their opposites, it is his proper function (officium) to 
depart from life.
Suicide would be rational for anyone faced with a preponderance of things contrary to 
nature, because any of them, such as poverty, ill health, and pain, if serious and persistent 
enough, would make it impossible for a human being to live in accordance with nature, and 
to engage in the selection of things in accordance with nature in which virtuous action 
consists. Thus, the Stoics argued, a person ought to consider suicide when faced with 
overwhelming situations like extreme poverty, intense pain, and chronic serious illness, not
j
to escape the pain involved, which is an indifferent, but because these conditions will *1920
In the passages on Stoic views about suicide gathered together in SVF, only two mention this type of 
suicide: SVF 3.757 (the D.L. passage translated above), and SFV 3.768 (Cramer, Paris Anécdota 
4.403), a long passage which compares life to a drinking party and argues that just as there are five 
reasons that a drinking party is broken up, so there are five reasons one departs life by committing 
suicide. For a fuller discussion of the passage, see Griffin (1986) 73.
19 SVF 3. 763 = Long and Sedley (1987) 66G.
20 For an account of the Cynic view of suicide, see Rist (1976) 237-238.
21 Cicero De Finibus 3. 60. Translation from Long and Sedley Vol. I (1987) 425.
prevent him or her from practicing virtue. If the opportunity for virtuous action remains, 
we should stay alive, if it does not, we should depart.
In addition to the two types of reasons for Stoic suicide mentioned in Diogenes 
Laertius, a third type is reported:
(3) Avoidance of being forced to do or sav immoral or shameful things. The Stoics 
held that it was permissible, perhaps even the duty, of a person who was being forced to 
perform an immoral or shameful act to commit suicide to avoid having to do it. This feature 
appears most prominently in SVF 3.757,22 where life is compared to a drinking party, 
and one of five possible reasons listed for leaving a drinking party, the arrival of abusive 
party-goers, is used to illustrate a similar occasion for leaving life : when tyrants try to 
force a person to do or say shameful things.
Just how this passage should be interpreted is controversial.^^ One of the Stoic 
paradoxes was that only the wise man is free, and all other men are slaves. The Stoics 
considered the wise man to be free because he has the power of autopragia, or self-
determination.24 He could never be forced to do anything against his will.25
;
Recognizing that virtuous action is the only good, and bad actions the only evil, the wise 
man would never perform any vicious action to avoid things that are not evil, including the 
threats of a tyrant to take money away from him, imprison him, torture him, or even put 
him to death. The wise man would prefer to suffer any of these things, and even commit 
suicide, rather than commit evil acts.
Connected to this is a related doctrine which appears in later Stoic sources:^ that 
human beings are justified in committing suicide to preserve their conception of self, that 234*
22 See n. 18 above.
23 See Sandbach (1975) 50, Griffin (1976) 379-383 and (1986) 72-75.
24 D.L. 7. 121. See below, p. 12.
2  ^ Epictetus analyzes why someone who is truly virtuous cannot be made to do anything against his will 
at 4.68-90. More will be said about the freedom of the wise man below.
Cicero Off.I. 112; Epictetus 1. 2. 25-37. On these passages, see Griffin (1976) 381-383.26
is, in Roman terms, to preserve their dignitas27 This justification for suicide seems to 
have developed as part of Panaetius’ doctrine of the four personae and is best known to us 
from Book I of Cicero’s De Officiis?& Briefly, Panaetius taught that there are four 
personae, or “roles,” by which we define ourselves and discover what is fitting (prepon; 
decorum) for us to do: (1) our common nature as human beings, (2) our individual natures, 
(3) our social position and other things bestowed on us by fortune, and (4) the occupation 
we choose. Panaetius concentrated on the duties (kathêkonta; officia) of the non-wise, and 
as part of his account he stressed the need for acting consistently with one’s various 
personae. Thus, in passages probably based on Panaetian accounts, Cicero and Epictetus 
argue that committing suicide or facing certain death is appropriate in order to maintain 
one’s commitment to one’s personae7 ^  Just as the wise man will commit suicide or suffer 
death rather than commit any evil, so should the non-wise on this latter account suffer 
punishment, and, if the stakes are high enough and one is brave enough, even death, 
rather than commit any action which is not consistent with their personae, that is, which is 
not “fitting.”
j
One further topic needs to be discussed before turning to Seneca. The question has 
been raised about whether the Stoics taught that both wise men and fools, or just wise men, 
should commit suicide when the conditions are right.30 In the passage quoted earlier,31 
Diogenes Laertius only reports the Stoics’ view about when the wise man will commit 
suicide. The Stoic wise man, possessed of perfect virtue and knowledge, will unerringly 27*30
27 See Griffin (1976) 379.
28 Off. 1.107-121. On the four personae theory, see Gill (1988a). Gill discusses the Cicero and 
Epictetus passages (above, n. 27) on 191.
29 Thus Cicero (Off. 1 .112) approves of Cato’s suicide as consistent with his character (and maintains it 
would not have been consistent for others), and Epictetus (1 .2 .25 -37 ) says that it is right for an 
athlete to die rather than have his genitals amputated, and a philosopher to die rather than submit to 
having his beard shaved off. All of these cases show that commitment to one’s personae could be so 
strong as to justify or even require death in order to act consistently with them.
30 Rist (1969) 239-241 raises the question, but as I indicate, I do not see it as a problem. Sandbach 
(1975) 49 n. 1 also disagrees with Rist on this point.
3* Above, p. 3.
7know when the time and conditions are right to commit suicide. But what about the rest of 
mankind? Did the Stoics think that it was ever right for them to commit suicide? It is 
clear from De Finibus 3. 60-61 that the Stoics discussed suicide in the context of duties 
(,kathêkonta; officia) that applied to all men, fools and wise.32 Suicide, like all duties, can 
be performed by all men when the conditions are right. It is the duty of fools, just like 
wise men, to sacrifice themselves for their country or friends, and, when the things 
contrary to nature completely outweigh the things in accordance with nature, to end their 
lives. Likewise, fools have the duty to live consistently with their personae, and in extreme 
circumstances to die rather than act inconsistently. Fools might make a mistake about their 
choice, but this is something that is possible in every action they perform. It is only the 
Stoic wise man who will know with unerring accuracy when he ought to commit suicide. 
His duty (kathêkon) will be a virtuous action (katorthôma).
3. Seneca’s Treatment of Suicide
Seneca’s treatment of suicide is compatible with the account just sketched. His 
discussions of suicide show that he recognized the same three classes of reasons for 
committing suicide as earlier Stoics.3  ^ He (1) talks about the need to sacrifice oneself for 
country or friends,3^ (2) discusses and gives examples of people who should consider 
suicide when faced with chronic and painful diseases, the effects of debilitating old age, 
and other things contrary to nature that are so damaging that they make virtuous life 
impossible,3^ and (3), as we will see below, praises people who commit suicide to 3245
32 This is consistent with SVF 3.759-760, which indicate Chrysippus argued that there are occasions 
when the wise man will commit suicide, and fools stay alive. Chrysippus is concerned to show that 
whether one is to stay in life or not is not determined by whether one is virtuous or not (in which case 
the wise man would never commit suicide, while the fool always would), but on the preponderance of 
the indifferents.
33 Grisé (1982) 211-212 analyzes the various reasons Seneca approves of for committing suicide. All of 
them can be classified under one of the three types of suicides approved of by the Stoics.
34 Letters 76. 27; 6. 2
35 Letters 30; 61; 58. 32-37.
preserve their dignitas and consistency of character.36 Seneca’s discussion also seems 
orthodox in its attention to the distinction between wise men and fools. 37 Like earlier 
Stoics, Seneca thinks that it is at times appropriate for both fools and wise men to commit 
suicide. As is the case with all actions, a wise man will know when and how to commit the 
perfect suicide, while the fool will not, but Seneca’s account clearly makes room for the 
suicides of both.
What has been found most problematic about Seneca’s account of suicide is the
enthusiasm with which he speaks about it, and the way in which he so often discusses it in
the context of freedom, or libertas. A good example of this occurs at the end of the On
Providence (VI. 7-8):
Contemnite fortunam; nullum illi telum quo feriret animum dedi. Ante 
omnia cavi, ne quid vos teneret invitos; pateat exitus. Si pugnare non 
vultis, licet fugere. Ideo ex omnibus rebus quas esse vobis necessarias 
volui nihil feci facilius quam mori. Prono animam loco posui: trahitur.
Adtendite modo et videbitis quam brevis ad libertatem et quam expedita 
ducat via.
Tum your nose up at fortune. I (sc. God) have given it no weapon with 
which it can strike your mind. Above all beware that nothing hold you back 
against your will. The door lies open. If you don’t want to fight, you can 
flee. Thus, of all the things that I wanted to be required of you, I made 
nothing easier than death. I have placed your soul on a slanted slope: it is 
being dragged down. Only pay attention and you will see how how short 
and how quick a road leads to freedom.
God, the imagined speaker in the passage, tells men that it is suicide which allows us to
spurn fortune and gain freedom. Why does Seneca speak so enthusiastically about suicide,
and how are suicide and freedom related? There are many other passages in Seneca where
suicide and freedom {libertas) are discussed in the same context. They are difficult to sort
out, and not enough attention has been paid to the way in which Seneca connects the two
concepts. To understand Seneca’s position, and why he often speaks about suicide in such
enthusiastic terms, we must look at the contexts in which he discusses suicide and 367
36 Ben. I. 11.4; Letter 77. 14-15 (discussed below).
37 See especially Letters 30. 8; 70. 5-6,19; 75. 8-18.
libertas.38 w e will find that suicide is connected to three different conceptions of libertas in 
Seneca.
A) Libertas = Freedom from the vicissitudes of life through death.
One way that Seneca looks at suicide is as a means of freeing oneself from physical
pain, debilitating diseases, torture, suffering, and the senility óf old age. A few brief
excerpts from the Letters will illustrate this use of libertas. First, a passage from Letter 12.
10, on the topic of old age:
Patent undique ad libertatem viae multae breves, faciles. Agamus deo 
gratias, quod nemo in vita teneri potest.
Many short and easy roads to freedom lie open on all sides. Let us thank 
god, that no one is able to be kept in life.
In Letter 70.14-16 he attacks some philosophers who say that one should not commit
suicide, but wait to die naturally:
Hoc qui dicit, non videt se libertatis viam cludere. Nil melius aetema lex 
fecit, quam quod unum introitum nobis ad vitam dédit, exitus multos. Ego 
expectem vel morbi crudelitatem vel hominis, cum possim per media exire 
tormenta et adversa discutere?
He who says this does not realize that he blocks off the road of freedom.
The eternal law did nothing better than giving us one entrance into life, but 
many exits. Should I await the cruelty of disease or man, when I am able to 
exit through the middle of tortures and shake off my adversities?
Finally, in a passage from Letter 91. 21, he praises the advantages of death when it is “in
our power”:
At illud seis, quam multis utilis sit, quam multos liberet tormentis, egestate, 
querellis, suppliciis, taedio. Non sumus in ullius potestate, cum mors in 
nostra potestate sit.
(
But you know this, to how many men it (death) is useful, how many men it 
frees from tortures, destitution, ailments, torments, and weariness. We are 
in the power of no one, when death is in our power. 38
38 Tadic-Gilloteaux (1963) 544, Rist (1969) 246-250, Griffin (1976) 367-388, and Grisé (1982) 211-217 
all discuss the emphasis on freedom in Seneca’s account o f suicide, but do not note that Seneca 
discusses suicide in the context of several different kinds of freedom.
These and similar passages^ talk about suicide in a way compatible with Stoic teachings. 
As we saw earlier, one of the three types of reasons for committing suicide was to address 
a gross imbalance of indifferents. The cases of suicide that Seneca mentions in these 
passages are all ones in which individuals, lacking important “preferred indifferents” or 
“things according to nature” and possessing heavy burdens of “things contrary to nature,” 
are justified in Stoic terms to contemplate and commit suicide.
It is important to see what Seneca means by praising death and suicide for providing 
freedom from “tortures, destitution, ailments, torments, weariness” and the like. Seneca is 
not saying that these sufferings, and the pain they cause, in themselves provide good 
reasons for suicide. Seneca remarks in Letter 58. 36 that one should not commit suicide to 
avoid pain, but only when the constant pain prevents one from living a worthwhile life.39 40 
Thus when Seneca describes suicide in such instances as providing “freedom,” he means 
that it provides freedom from a life in which “things contrary to nature” make virtuous 
activity no longer possible.
2) Libertas = freedom to act consistently and preserve one’s dwnitas
A less frequent use of the concept of freedom in Seneca’s discussions of suicide is 
illustrated in Letter 77. 14. Seneca tells the story of a Spartan boy who was captured and 
made a slave. He could not bear his slavery, and the first time he was forced to perform a 
“servile and humiliating task,”41 shouted “I will not be a slave” (“non serviam”) and 
cracked his head against a wall. Seneca applauds his actions and remarks, “So close at 
hand is freedom (libertas); and is anyone a slave?” This passage fits in with a number of 
passages in which Seneca praises the actions of men who valued freedom so much that
39 e.g. Ad Marciam 19-20.
40 Letter 58. 36: “I will not lay violent hands on myself on account of pain; this kind of death is defeat. 
But nevertheless if  I learn that my suffering will be permanent, I will exit, not because of the 
suffering, but because it will keep me from everything for the sake of which I live.”
He was asked to fetch a chamber pot.41
they died rather than be slaves.4^  Some of Seneca’s respect for such actions probably 
derives from traditional Roman values: libertas was a highly charged word even under the 
emperors. But how can praise for such actions be justified in Stoic terms? There are two 
possibilities.
The first would be to explain the example in terms of the “balance of indifferents.” 
When one asks from what thing the Spartan boy is freed from when he commits suicide, 
the only answer can be “slavery.” But what is so bad about slavery? In Stoic terms, it is 
not an evil (only moral viciousness is). It would seem to be one of the “indifferents.” If 
this is true, and libertas itself can be considered one of the “preferred indifférents,” and its 
opposite, slavery, a “not preferred indifferent,”* 43 a possible explanation could be given of 
why Seneca thinks it is right for the Spartan boy to commit suicide rather than be a slave. 
As we saw earlier, the Stoics believed that there were occasions when the imbalance of 
indifferents was so great that a virtuous life was not possible, and suicide was appropriate. 
Could the Spartan slave boy represent such a case? If he does, Seneca would have to 
believe that the slavery the boy faced was of such an overwhelming kind that his life was 
not worth living (i.e. could not be lived virtuously). Seneca indicates that the boy was 
asked to perform a degrading action (fetching a chamber pot), but it is hard to see how this 
would provide a reason for committing suicide parallel to extreme poverty or serious 
chronic illness. There may be cases where someone was subjected to such awful
43 Seneca also praises the deaths o f the Numantians (Letter 66 .13), the actions of a slave who killed his 
master and himself when they were captured (Ben. 3 .23 . 5), and those o f a German gladiator-trainee 
who committed suicide by stuffing a toilet sponge down his throat (Letter 70.20-21). Seneca 
comments on the last example, “the most sordid death is preferable to the cleanest kind o f slavery” 
(Letter 70. 21: ...praeferendam esse spurcissimam mortem servitud mundissimae).
43 Freedom and slavery do not appear on the standard Stoic lists of “preferred” and “not preferred”
indifferents, but there are reasons to think they could be considered such. Freedom/slavery seem to 
meet the same criteria that other indifferents (health/sickness, wealth/poverty, life/death, etc.) do: they 
are a pair which are not good/evil in themselves, they do not always and necessarily benefit/harm, but 
can on occasion be put to bad/good use. Finally, freedom is normally considered to have value (and is 
therefore normally selected when conditions permit, while slavery is normally not selected. On the 
criteria for indifferents, see Long and Sedley Vol. I (1987) 357-359. Given all this, it is curious that 
freedom/slavery do not appear on the standard lists o f indifferents.
conditions as a slave that a virtuous life would not be possible, but Seneca gives no 
indication that this was true of the Spartan slave boy.
Rather, Seneca’s account seems more compatible with the type of suicide sanctioned in 
the context of Panaetius’ four personae theory that was discussed earlier. Seneca would 
thus be praising the slave boy for behaving courageously and consistently. The slave boy 
would be saying, by committing suicide, that freedom was so important to him (in his 
persona as an individual, and his persona as a member of a certain class and nation) that he 
would rather die than lose his freedom and degrade himself (and his dignitas) by 
performing unworthy service. Seneca would probably not say that it was appropriate that 
everyone commit suicide in such circumstances, but he does applaud the actions of those 
whose personality, commitments, and courage would make such actions consistent.^
3) Libertas = freedom from fear in this life.
As I mentioned earlier, one of the Stoic paradoxes was that only the wise man is free,
all other men slaves. Diogenes Laertius (7.121) writes,^
[The Stoics] say that he [the wise man] alone is free (eleutheron), and that 
fools are slaves. For they say that freedom is the power of self- 
determination (iautopragias), and slavery the lack of self-determination.
How Seneca interpreted this form of freedom, the power of self-determination, is brought
out in Letter 51.9:4 56
Libertas proposita est; ad hoc praemium laboratur. Quae sit libertas, 
quaeris? Nulli reí serviré, nulli necessitati, nullis casibus, fortunam in 
aequum deducere. Quo die illa me intellexero plus posse, nil potent. Ego 
illam feram, cum in manu mors sit?
Freedom is in sight. This is the prize I am working for. What is freedom, 
you ask? To be a slave to no situation, to no necessity, to no chance events; 
to force fortune onto an even playing field. On that day when I know that I
44 Seneca approves o f the action of the Spartan boy to such an extent that he asks Lucilius if it is not 
true he would have wanted his own son to behave similarly. Seneca implies that he, Lucilius and his 
son, and all others like them should commit suicide under similar conditions.
45 SV F 3. 355. See also SVF 3. 362-363, 544.
4b For a similar definition of freedom, see Letter 75.18.
am more powerful, fortune will have no power. Shall I put up with her, 
when death is under my control?
One of the most insistent themes in Seneca’s works is the fear of death and the lack of
freedom it produces in this life, and it is in this context that references to a third kind of
libertas and suicide are found in Seneca. Seneca, like earlier Stoics, held that only the wise
man is free, and all other men slaves. He argued that suicide plays a role in guaranteeing
the freedom of the wise man. But as we will see, he also identified a way in which suicide
could guarantee limited but still important types of freedom to those who had not yet
become wise men.
Let us return for a moment to the difference between the Stoic wise man and the rest of 
mankind in meeting death. Seneca tells us {Letter 30. 8-12) that only the wise man can 
meet death with an untroubled firmness of spirit (lentam animi firmitatem), and he contrasts 
those who face death with a tranquillity which results from certain judgment (ex indicio 
certo tranquillitas) with two other groups: (a) those who fear death and beg for life, and (b) 
those who demand death (deposcunt mortem) and go to meet it out of madness or a sudden 
fit of rage (ex rabie...ac repentina indignatione). Seneca argues against both these ways of 
facing death in several passages,and repeatedly writes that our goal should be to face 
death as far as possible like a sage: rationally, calmly, gladly, and always ready to depart.
But what does it mean to face death like a wise man, and what role does suicide play in
the process? In Letter 71. 26, Seneca writes, ,
Quid est in tormentis, quid est in aliis, quae adversa appellamus, malí?
Hoc, ut opinor, succidere mentem et incurvari et succumbere. Quorum nihil 
sapienti viro potest evenire; stat rectus sub quolibet pondere. Nulla ilium 
res minorem facit; nihil illi eorum, quae ferenda sunt, displicet. Nam 
quicquid cadere in hominem potest, in se cecidisse non queritur. Vires suas 
novit.
What evil is there in torture, or in other things we call adversities? This, I 
think: that the mind gives way, bends, and collapses. None of these things 
can happen to the wise man. He stands upright under any load. Nothing 
diminishes him. None of these things that he must endure bothers him. He 47
47 Letters 24. 22-26; 58. 32-36; 77. 6.
does not complain when anything that can befall man has befallen him. He 
knows his own strength.
The wise man presents an awesome spectacle. Knowing, as he does, the difference
between virtue and vice, good and evil, and things that are indifferent, and knowing his
own strength, both physical and mental, the wise man is able to withstand any amount of
torture, illness, poverty, and pain with a firm and tranquil mind, and has no fear of death at
all. He feels physical pain,48 but his mind does not collapse: he will never view any of
these things as bad. The wise man may commit suicide under such conditions, but not to
escape pain.49 He will exit only when it seems right for him to do so, when he is sure that
the sufferings he is undergoing make virtuous action impossible.50 The wise man is
always free because he is never forced to do anything against his will. Suicide plays a role
in the freedom of the wise man because it allows him to exit when he should. The wise
man, not fearing death as an evil and knowing that he can commit suicide at any time it is
called for, is completely free and in control of his own fate.51
Seneca realizes that there is a great difference between the wise man and the rest of us. 
We have many fears and anxieties, chief among them the fear death, and as long as we 
have these fears, we can never be free and in control of ourselves. They hold us back and 
enslave us. But Seneca also stresses that we have the power to change. This is why he 
devotes so much energy in his works to help his readers overcome their fears.
Seneca believes that the best way for us to overcome and gain freedom from our fears 
is to think about them constantly and see them in the proper perspective. He repeatedly 
exhorts us to meditate on death and other fearful events so that they will lose their terror. 
This technique was known as praemeditatio malorum, or “thinking about evils before they 
arrive,” and was an important means Stoics used to overcome anxiety about possible future
48 Letter 5 1 .3 0
49 Letter 58. 36.
50 Letters 104. 3-5; 98. 15-18
51 See De Prov. VI. 6-9 (part of which is quoted above), where Seneca stresses this fact.
evils.52 It involved thinking often about bad things that could happen in the future 
(extreme poverty, catastrophic illness, torture, death of those close to us, our own death) 
and taking the fear out of them in two ways:53 (1) by depriving them of their unexpected 
character, and (2) by viewing them rationally, i.e„ seeing that they are not evils and cannot 
in themselves make us unhappy (only our improper attitude toward them can do that). 
Ideally, by constantly examining “evils” such as poverty, illness, and death, we begin to 
see them for what they are, and make progress towards virtue. Such a process should 
enable us, when we encounter any of these “bad things” in the future, to see them as 
indifferents and face them like a wise man.
But what is the role that suicide plays in this process of progressing towards virtue? In
the Consolation to Marcia (20.2-3) Seneca tells how death and the possibility of suicide
keep us free of worry in the present:
haec est, inquam, quae efficit, ut nasci non sit supplicium, quae efficit, ut 
non concidam adversus minas casuum, ut servare animum salvum ac 
potentem sui possim: habeo quod appellem. Video istic cruces non unius 
quidem generis sed aliter ab aliis fabricatas: capite quidam conversos in 
terram suspendere, alii per obscena stipitem egerunt, alii brachia patíbulo 
explicuerunt; video fidiculas, video verbera, et membris singulis articulis 
singula nocuerunt machinamenta. At video et mortem. Sunt istic hostes 
cruenti, cives superbi; sed video istic et mortem. Non est molestum servire, 
ubi, si dominii pertaesum est, licet uno gradu ad libertatem transire. Caram 
te, vita, beneficio mortis habeo.
It is this [sc. death], I say, that prevents birth from being a punishment, that 
prevents me from collapsing in the face of the threats of misfortunes, that 
allows me to be able to keep my mind safe and under my own control. I 
have a higher court of appeal. Over there I see torture devices not of a 
single design, but constructed in different ways by different people. Some 
men have hung their victims upside down, others have driven a stake 
through the genitals, others have wrenched the arms with a fork-shaped 
yoke. I see racks, I see whippings, and each joint and limb has its own 
custom-made torture machine. But I also see death. Over there are sadistic 
enemies, arrogant citizens. But over there too I see death. It is no trouble 
to be a slave, when, if one grows tired of the master, in one step one can 
walk to freedom. Life, I hold you dear through the kindness of death.
52 On praemeditatio malorum, see Tadic-Gilloteaux (1963) 548-549; Hadot (1969) 60-62, Gill (1988b) 
13. Seneca treats the topic extensively. See, for example, Letters 2 6 .1 0  and 69 .6 .
53 Gill (1988b) 13
In this vivid passage, Seneca is making a large claim. He says that the knowledge that 
we can die when we want prevents us from worrying about what are normally seen as great 
evils, including torture, and keeps our mind under our own control. Seneca’s position in 
this passage can be interpreted in several different ways, depending on the perspective of 
the reader, that is, how much progress the reader has made along the road to virtue.
The reader who understands the perspective of Stoicism only a little or not at all could 
interpret this passage in a way that would be compatible with some modem views on 
suicide: that the possibility of suicide is a great boon to mankind because it can free us 
from life’s evils. Knowing that we always have the option to die when we want no matter 
how bad the situation is, we do not have to worry about the gruesome tortures he lists. By 
refusing to value life too highly, and by realizing that death can provide a final freedom 
from intolerable situations, we can also be free of worry now, and in this sense be free.
No matter how threatening the thought of future evils may be, we can be calm in the 
knowledge that we can always kill ourselves.
Seneca seems to think that such a perspective on death and suicide is helpful as far as it 
goes: for people who view the pains of torture, illness, and poverty as evils, suicide does 
provide relief and calms their anxieties to some extent.54 5People can be calm when 
thinking about or being threatened by “evils,” because they know that suicide can provide 
them with a reliable way of escaping them. This would explain why Seneca praises the 
courage and ingenuity of many, including slaves and gladiators, who view life as 
something that can be given up and who commit suicide rather than endure their fate.^5 
But of course Seneca would not think such a view of suicide was right, nor would he think 
it provided a reliable strategy for allaying fear. From a Stoic perspective, it is a desperate 
act based on an incorrect view: that the pains of torture, illness, poverty et a i are evils, and
54 This would explain why in some passages like those quoted above on p. 9, Seneca talks in ordinary, 
non-Stoic language about the good death brings people when it frees them from excessive pain, etc.
55 See especially Letter 70.19-28.
such great evils that we must flee from them by killing ourselves. Suicide provides 
freedom from these “evils,” but under such circumstances is not a free act. As Seneca tells 
us, the wise man, the ultimate standard of conduct, should not flee life, but exit it.56
But for a second group of people, those making progress toward virtue by meditating 
on future “evils,” suicide can play a more effective role in allaying fear, and one closer to 
the role it plays for the Stoic wise man. As people practice praemeditatio malorum, they 
begin to see what the nature of the things are that they fear as evils. They gradually realize 
that ill health, poverty, even death, are not evils, but just indifferents, and that the only evil 
is wickedness, the only good virtue. They begin to see reality as a wise man does. Seneca 
describes in detail the stages that one goes through on the road to virtue,57 and admits that 
almost no one ever progresses far enough to become a sage, secure in his or her virtue and 
happiness. But this does not mean people should stop trying, since the rewards of 
progress towards virtue are valuable, even if one never completely attains virtue. The 
closer people are to virtue, the more peace of mind they have.
The concept of suicide makes an important contribution to this peace of mind. In the 
quotation above from Letter 71, Seneca states that the only evil thing about torture and 
other things we call adversities is that they can force the mind to bend and collapse. They 
cause the mind to give up its view of them as indifferents and force it to view them as evils. 
When this happens, the mind gives way, is seized by fear, and one can no longer die as 
one ought: “virtuously, sensibly, and courageously.”58 But how does a person who is 
making progress towards virtue, but is not yet a wise man, know how he or she will act 
when faced with death? How does a person know that under the pressure of extreme pain, 
such as torture, a life threatening illness, or other serious adversity, his or her mind will not 
give out, forced by pain to give up its knowledge that these adversities are not “non-
55 Letter 24. 25: Virfortis ac sapiens non fugere debet e vita, sed exire.
57 Letters 71. 27-37; 75. 8-18.
58 Letter 77. 6: honeste.,.prudenter,fortiter.
preferred indifferents,” and to embrace the false belief that they are true evils? The answer 
is suicide. It protects virtue.
In a passage that immediately follows the one quoted from Letter 71,59 Seneca writes 
that the wise man is composed of two parts: the body, which is irrational, and can be 
“bitten, burned, and feel pain,” and the mind, which is rational, “holds opinions which 
cannot be shaken, and is fearless and unconquerable,” and in which the “highest 
good”(summum bonum ) of man resides. He contrasts the wise men with people who are 
making progress towards virtue, and says the difference between them is that while the 
wise man will never falter, those progressing towards virtue “will sometimes give way and 
let something slacken from the intention of the mind.”60 In other words, whereas the 
wise man’s mind will never give way, and always hold firm to its true opinions about the 
nature of the pain that is assailing it, the minds of those who are progressing towards virtue 
will not be able to. Their minds may hold out for shorter or longer periods depending on 
how far advanced they are towards virtue, but eventually their minds will give way, and 
will give up their true opinions for false ones. Torture, for instance, will be viewed as an 
indifferent at the start, but the pain will eventually make the person’s mind give way, so 
that he or she begins to see torture, falsely, as an evil, and views him or herself as being 
harmed. The passage quoted above from the Consolation to Marcia shows how suicide 
can give comfort to those making progress towards virtue who would otherwise worry 
about giving way under intense pain. These people, who realize that their greatest good 
and only source of happiness in all situations, and especially under dire conditions, is to 
view things “rationally,” and keep their minds firm and under control,61 see that suicide 
can be used to preserve their virtue. Before their minds give way, and begin to see their
59 L e tte rn .  27
ibit interim cessim et rermttet aliquid ex intentione mentis
61 See De Prov. 6. 7-9, Ad Marciam 20. 2-3, De Const. 6.4.
pain as an evil instead of as an indifferent, they can commit suicide, dying bravely, 
happily, and in command of their rational facilities.
There is still a difference between the suicides of wise men and those making progress 
towards virtue of course. The wise man is completely free: he can hold out as long as he 
wants under torture, and never gives way. He will always see virtue as the only good, vice 
as the only evil, no matter how painful the torture. His suicide is always a free choice. 
Those making progress towards virtue do not act with the same freedom. They view the 
pain as the wise man does, but their opinion about it is not unshakeable. They cannot 
argue against the body forever. But they can, thanks to suicide, preserve their virtue by 
departing life before their minds give way.
If this interpretation is correct, it helps us explain one final aspect of Seneca’s account 
of suicide. At the end of On Providence,62 Seneca has God speak and tell us that death is 
quick and provides an easy road to freedom. He adds the claim that it is good that he made 
death quicker than birth. He says, “fortune would have held great power over you, if man 
were to die as slow as he is bom.” It is important that death come quickly, so that those 
progressing toward virtue can depart exactly when they want to, before they are persuaded 
by pain and lose their rationality. If this happened, fortune would have more power over 
men than it does.
4. Conclusion
Seneca’s view of suicide was based on the earlier teachings of the Stoics, and he 
seems to have been orthodox about under what conditions one would consider suicide: 
when it was called for by obligations owed to one’s country or friends, when the physical 
conditions of life were so inhospitable that one could no longer practice virtue, or when one 
was going to be forced to perform actions so base or contrary to one’s character that life 
was no longer worth the price. But to say only this is to miss the richness of Seneca’s
62 In a continuation of the passage quoted above, p. 8.
account of suicide. For not only does suicide provide freedom from the vicissitudes of life 
that preclude the possibility of virtuous action, but it also can give human beings freedom 
from worry about the future. It protects the freedom of the wise man by allowing him to 
exit whenever it seems right to do so, and it provides some consolation to men by allowing 
them to escape, when they want, from what they perceive as evils. It also provides great 
consolation to those progressing toward virtue. They know that they can never be forced 
to lose their correct view of virtue, no matter what the adversity. They can commit suicide 
before their mind loses its true opinion, and die like wise men instead of like fools.
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